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ABSTRACT
The observation of time evolution of Representative’s votes for several bills, without any knowledge of the bill’s contents, and
without any hypothetical question asked to the Representatives, is a way to perform a no questionnaire, using only revealed
choices, sociology study. Transparency laws requiring Representative votes to be publicly available assure that no privacy right
was violated in this kind of study. The votes data can be used to obtain Representative versus Representative correlation, and
correlation distance matrices, from which one can extract Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) networks. MST ordered correlation
matrices display clearly the Representative clusters and the political diversity in that society, while the time evolution of the
correlation coefficient distribution can show the degree of polarization of the parliament, and typical trajectories during a
presidential term. Atypical polarization trajectory, observed in both, MST correlation matrices and correlation distribution, is a
sign of political instability and can provide an indicator of the imminence of a fall of the Government. The general problem
addressed by this paper is how to use the Representative votes only to extract Representative’s MST networks, correlation
distribution and clusters, polarization degree and signs of political instability. Here we show, that a typical presidential term
trajectory evolves from a big Government supporters cluster, surrounded by the opposition in a strongly polarised state in the
first year, to a consensus at the end, and that political instability arise when a small hard cluster of Government supporters is
opposed by several, even dispersed, clusters. The first difference of our study in comparison to previous studies was the use of
a scale of seven vote possibilities, instead of the typical yea or nay scale used in other studies, because it is clear that the option
to not vote, or others, is also a political expression and shall be used in the correlation between Representatives. Also, the use
of correlation distance MST ordered matrices, as far as we know, for the first time, revealed clearly the blind clusters regardless
the Representative party, state or any other attribute. Finally, the time evolution results for more than two presidential terms
revealed a typical trajectory and the situation of high political instability in the unique rare event of a presidential impeachment
we could observe. The methodology used here is unbiased, because there was no question, impossible to be formulated
without bias, asked to Representatives, and, also, uses only revealed choices instead of a quick Representative answer to
hypothetical question that can be much different from the answer in the real situation. No questionnaire sociology could be
used nowadays observing spontaneous speeches of internet users in Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn and other social
networks, provided that no privacy right is broken, when it is possible to infer that the sample used is representative of the
whole society. Correlation distances can be obtained for any set of elements that share some attributes, and MST can be
drawn out of these distances, opening up the way to increase the degree of generalization of our procedure beyond the specific
question it was used for. That means this methodology could be applied to sociology, economics, biology, genetics, diseases,
drug responses and other knowledge fields.
Introduction.
The democracy nowadays faces several challenges, especially those concerned with the rules adopted to choose Representatives
and to subsequently follow their behavior in office. Modern society must deal with all sorts of threats, at national and global
levels, which ranges from security to nature preservation, and to social impacts of scientific and technological changes. Most
democratic societies do not want to delegate all the decisions concerning a regulation, or response to a threat, to a team of
experts, but rather to Representatives capable to listen and answer to the community thinking and needs. However, once elected,
no Representative can perceive completely all the issues related with their actions in their full social impact range, meaning that
they need to be in closer contact with those they represent and continuously receive their feedbacks. As a consequence, in order
to be resilient, today‘s democracies do not have to rely only on fraud free elections, but also on quick information about their
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Representative choices.
In the last years, the science of complex systems1–3 appeared to describe complex networks4 ascribing a measurement
of the relationship between network members. The first task for this kind of analysis, therefore, is to define and measure
relationship from the data, followed by the use of available graph theory methods5in order to characterize the resulting network
to extract repetitive patterns and draw objective conclusions. Network science have been able to analyze co-evolution of
marginalization in social transition6; describe the heterogeneity and interaction of human activity in social networks7, 8; explain
how the inheritance defines the structure of animal networks9; and showed the influence of precipitation rates on community
structures10, 11. Besides, the network science offers general outlines for functional brain networks12–14, market dynamic
analysis15–18 and others19–22.
Given the importance of the law system in daily life, it is not surprising that the complex network formalism has been
extensively adopted to describe intrinsic features of legislative systems. For instance, the rise of partisanship in the U.S House
of Representatives was studied by counting the number of yea/nay in roll-call votes, a measure of the degree of the ideological
relationships among members of different parties. The networks constructed using this approach revealed that partisanship
and non-cooperation had been increasing exponentially over the last 60 years, producing negative effects over the legislative
productivity23. Complex networks have also been utilized to analyze the legislative co-sponsorship in the U.S House and
Senate24, 25. The co-sponsorship network is typically denser than the legislative one, demonstrating the influence of institutional
arrangements and strategic incentives on co-sponsorship. Moreover, this type of network can be used to identify influential
legislators24 and to correlate the community structure of the legislative system with political ideologies25. From the roll-call
vote sequences, it was possible to create a bipartite network among the committees and Representatives in the U.S House26, 27,
disclosing an inner hierarchical structure of the U.S. legislative system. Its political and organizational features could then be
characterized without the need to introduce political information. Under the same framework, another study28 focused on party
polarization by using modularity measures over the set of roll-call votes, and the existence of strategies adopted by elites to
preserve the political order could be detected. Finally, the small-world property observed for legislative networks29 seems to
indicate that co-sponsorship is a form of communication which increases the effectiveness of the Congress.
Here the aim of this paper is to investigate the dynamics of the collective behavior of the Brazilian Federal Chamber.
As we show next, the proposed methodology, based on the network of correlations among roll-call sequences of votes of
Representatives, does not depend on the content of each voted bill or previous knowledge of partisanship relations. In our
completely unbiased framework, the conclusion emerged by themselves, highlighting the regularities and/or odd events. Besides,
this work includes most general states for the stance of Representatives such as obstructionism, abstentionism and absenteeism,
mainly because they also contain important information.
Results.
We use the results of the roll-call vote of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies for a period running from 2007 to 2015. This
period encloses two completes legislatures, 53th and 54th. The 53th legislature (2007-2010) encompass the last four-year term
of the former President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva and the 54th legislature (2011-2014) corresponds to the first four-year term
of the former President Dilma Rousseff. The year 2015 is the first year of the 55th legislature which culminated with the
impeachment of Rousseff in 2016. The Brazilian Federal Chamber is composed by 513 Deputies elected in general elections
together with the President and State Governors to legislate during a four-year term. In order to vote at the plenary sessions,
each Deputy has six options for expressing his stance in favor or against the bill under discussion. Here we quantify these votes
in terms of the following random variable
V =

2 if Yea,
1 if Abstention,
0 if Art. 17, Present,
−1 if Absence,
−2 if Obstruction,
−3 if Nay,
(1)
where the negative values indicate the tendency to refuse, while the positive values express the intention to approve the bill
voted. “Art. 17“ is an article that prevents the speaker of the Chamber to vote in the bill and the “Present“ option means “secret
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vote“. Observe that the “Yea“ and “Nay“ options are at the highest absolute values. The roll-call vote sequence in a given
year of each Federal Deputy in the Chamber provides an unambiguous signature of her/his political behavior. Moreover, by
cross-correlating the sequences of each pair of Deputy, we can objectively quantify the level of antagonism and partisanship
between them. From this calculation, it is then possible to construct the complex network of Deputies composing the Federal
Chamber. In Fig. 1, we show the description of a subset of this network built from correlations of vote sequences among six
Brazilian Federal Deputies.
Bill
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Bill
Bill
Vote
0.0
1.0
Bill
BillBill
Vote
Vote
VoteVote
Figure 1. Description of a complete graph built from correlations among typical roll-call vote sequences of six Brazilian
Federal Deputies. The nodes of the network correspond to Deputies (A, B, C, D, E and F). For better visualization, the plots of
the roll-call vote sequences associated to each Deputy show only 40 votes extracted from their original sequences. The weights
associated to the edges connecting every pair of nodes are given by the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between their
corresponding roll-call vote sequences, C(A,B) = cov(A,B)/[(σ(A)σ(B)]. Blue edges indicate that the connected Deputies
share positive correlations, meaning that they have a tendency to vote similarly. Deputies connected by red edges share negative
correlations, therefore being generally contrarians. Highly negative correlations clearly indicate the presence of two antagonist
clusters, as typified here by the groups (A, B, C) and (D, E, F).
The nodes of the network correspond to Deputies to whom distinct roll-call vote sequences in bills are associated. A
complete undirected network is built by connecting every pair of nodes, for example A and B, with edges whose weights are
given by the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between their corresponding roll-call vote sequences
C(A,B) =
cov(A,B)
σ(A)σ(B)
, (2)
where cov(A,B) = E[AB]−E[A]E[B] is the covariance among A and B roll-call votes sequences, E means expectation
value30, σ(A) and σ(B) are the variance of A and B, respectively. Deputies with similar roll-call vote sequences share positive
correlations, while Deputies with generally opposing votes share negative correlations. The occurrence of highly negative
correlations are associated with the presence of two or more antagonist clusters, each one of themselves constituted of partisan
Deputies.
In Fig. 2 we show the distributions of the correlation coefficients obtained from each pair of Brazilian Federal Deputies
during the 53th and 54th presidential legislatures of Brazil, corresponding to the second mandate of President Lula da Silva and
the first mandate of President Dilma Rousseff, respectively.
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Figure 2. Probability density distributions of the correlation coefficients obtained from each pair of roll-call vote sequences of
Brazilian Federal Deputies during the 53th (top) and 54th (bottom) presidential legislatures of Brazil. The blue dashed lines are
the best fits to the data sets using the bimodal logistic distribution, Eq. (3). In all cases, the coefficient of determination follows
R2 > 0.99. The distributions clearly evolve in time, within each legislature, from a bimodal to a monomodal shape. In the 53th
legislature, this transition occurs between the final years (2009 and 2010). In the case of the 54th legislature, however, it takes
place already between the two initial years (2011 and 2012).
It is important to note that, within each legislative term, the distribution evolves in time from a typical bimodal shape
including a substantial fraction of negative correlation values (more than 30% and 19% in the years 2007 and 2011, respectively),
to a monomodal shape with positive correlations constituting more than 97% of all values in both cases (years 2010 and 2014).
During the 53th legislature (second mandate of Lula da Silva), this transition only takes place effectively between the final years
(2009 and 2010). In the case of the 54th legislature (first mandate of Dilma Rousseff), however, it occurs between the two initial
years (2011 and 2012). This apparently precocious transition from polarized (bimodal with many negative correlations) to
more consensual (monomodal with very few negative correlations) states would eventually culminate with the impeachment of
President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, namely, the second year of her mandate, the 55th presidential term. Precisely, at the end of
2015, from a complaint of administrative impropriety, a lawsuit was filed seeking to prevent Dilma Rousseff’s term as president.
The process began on December 2, 2015 and ended on August 31, 2016. In contrast to the previous two first years of the 54th
and 55th legislatures (see the distributions for 2007 and 2011 in Fig.2), the bimodal shape of the distribution of correlation
coefficients shown in Fig. 3 is much less evident. Moreover, the fraction of negative correlation values observed in 2015 (15%)
is also substantially smaller than in 2007 (30%) and 2011 (19%).
55th Legislature - Dilma Rousseff
2015
Figure 3. Probability density distribution of the correlation coefficients obtained from each pair of roll-call vote sequences of
Brazilian Federal Deputies for the year 2015, the first year of the 55th legislature, corresponding to the beginning of the second
mandate of President Dilma Rousseff. The blue dashed line is the best fit to the data set using the bimodal logistic distribution,
Eq. (3). The coefficient of determination is R2 = 0.98.
In order to better quantify the evolution in time of the shape of the distribution of correlations shown in Figs. 2 and 3, we
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performed the best non-linear fit (See supplementary methods) to each data set of the bi-logistic distribution,
P(x;µ1,σ1,µ2,σ2,b) =
b
4σ1
sech2
(
x−µ1
2σ1
)
+
(1−b)
4σ2
sech2
(
x−µ2
2σ2
)
, (3)
where µ1,σ1,µ2,σ2 and b are the fitting parameters. From the estimated values of these parameters, we can calculate
the so-called bimodallity index, D ≡ |µ1−µ2|/
√
σ21 +σ
2
2 . Accordingly, a probability density distribution is considered to
be bimodal if D> 131. As depicted in Fig. 4, the index D decays practically in a linear fashion during the 53th presidential
legislature, corroborating the evolution from a bimodal to a unimodal shape of the distribution. The modality index of the
54th legislature, however, follows a much faster decay to the unimodal state and remains there at the beginning of the 55th
legislature.
55
54th Legislature - Dilma Rousseff
th Legislature - Dilma Rousseff
Year
53th Legislature - Lula da Silva
Figure 4. Time evolution of the bimodallity index D= |µ1−µ2|/
√
σ21 +σ
2
2 computed for the 53
th (blue circles), 54th (green
stars) and 55th (red triangle) legislative terms, corresponding to the second mandate of President Lula da Silva, and the first and
second mandates of President Dilma Rousseff, respectively. The parameters µ1, µ2, σ1 and σ2 are obtained for each year from
the best fits of the logistic distribution Eq. (3) to the corresponding probability density distributions of the Pearson’s correlation
coefficients obtained from each pair of roll-call vote sequences of Brazilian Federal Deputies, as shown in Figs. 2 and 3. A
density distribution is considered to be bimodal if D> 131. The dashed lines are guides to the eye.
At this point, we show that the bimodal shape as well as the presence of a relatively large fraction of negative values in
the distribution of correlations are closely associated with the polarization of voting in the Chamber of Deputies. This can be
visualized through the proper rearrangement of the correlation matrices built from the corresponding networks of all Brazilian
Federal Deputies calculated in a given year.
Figure 5 shows the correlations matrices organized accordingly to the parties and, within each party, in alphabetical order
on the left for three representative years (2007, first year of Lula‘s second mandate; 2010, last year of Lula‘s second mandate
and 2015, first year of Rousseff‘s second mandate). The strong color contrast of the 2007 party organized correlation matrix is
representative of a strong polarization, but it is hard to visualize the opponent blocks. In the center we present the Minimum
Spanning Tree (MST) network draw with the vertice’s color representing the Deputy party. This MST was obtained with
the correlation distance matrix d(A,B) =
√
2(1−C(A,B)), discussed in the supplementary methods. MST is a network that
connects all the vertices without any loops with the smallest distance pathway, and it is completely blind to any information
that influences the votes such as party, seeing only the revealed correlation between the Representative votes. Closer correlation
distance means highly correlated vertices. The spatial colour segregation that appeared, such as blue and yellow to the right and
red and green to the left, indicates that a blind MST is capable to discriminate clusters by itself, with further information such
as the clusters nodes. On the right, we show the correlation matrix re-ordered with Prim‘s algorithm of the MST. There are two
main algorithms to obtain a MST, Prim32 and Kruskal33, with the same final draw of the network. Although Kruskal‘s algorithm
is faster, Prim‘s algorithm evolves by the closest neighbours sub-networks, while Kruskal draws all sub-networks in parallel.
Prim, therefore, is already organizing the network by the strongest connected neighbours, and is ideal to re-order the correlation,
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or correlation distance matrices. In contrast to the party organized correlation matrix, the MST reordered matrix clearly shows
opposing clusters. There are two big clusters representing the government (the large block on the up-left) and the opposition
(the smaller block on bottom-right), but we can visualize sub-blocks in the opposition cluster as well. In the government block
there is a continuous transition between hard supporters at the far up-left to light supporters at the bottom-right boundary. To
the best our knowledge, this is the first time that MST-prim ordering is used. Supplementary methods shows the same figures
for all years from 2007 to 2015.
53th Legislature - 2007 - Lula da Silva
55th Legislature - 2015 - Dilma Rousseff
54th Legislature - 2010 - Lula da Silva
Figure 5. On the left are the correlation matrices associated with the networks of all Brazilian Federal Deputies for the years
2007, 2010 and 2015. The colors correspond to the values of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between pairs of Deputies,
calculated from their roll-call vote sequences in the respective year. The positions of each Deputy in the rows and columns are
organized according to their parties (for better visualization, the solid black lines delimit the parties with more than 10
Representatives) and, within each party, in alphabetical order. In the center are the minimum spanning trees (MST) extracted
from the network of correlations among Deputies for the same years, computed using Prim’s algorithm32. In these networks,
the colour cluster of vertices were imposed according to the political party and the size is associated to the number of votes in
which were elected. The correlation matrices are shown again on the right, but now the positions of each Deputy are ordered
according to the sequence of construction of the corresponding MST, as explained in the text.
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By comparing the first and last years of the same mandate, i.e., 2007 and 2010, respectively, the correlation matrices show
the evolution from a highly polarized Chamber of Deputies, with basically two main antagonist blocks to a more harmonious
behavior. A similar, but less remarkable transformation can be observed during the 54th legislature (see Fig.2 of supplementary
methods). Finally, the absence of strong polarization in 2015 relates to the gradual lack of political support of the Chamber to
the Government, which eventually led to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016.
The Null Model of our data was obtained by shuffling the votes among the Representatives and bills, keeping the same
distribution for the votes. The result is shown in the supplementary methods. The MST-ordered correlation matrices did not
show any special feature nor cluster, the MST network do not show any color segregation. This show the cluster and regularities
we observed cannot be explained by a random process, but came from real behavior of the Representatives.
Conclusion.
A summary of our observations is: (1) MST- Prim reordering of correlation distance matrices of a complete network is capable
to display the inner clusters of Representative‘s similarities. (2) There are more than two clusters of Representatives showing
clearly different degrees of disagreement/agreement between them, with two main stronger clusters, regardless Deputy‘s party.
(3) Although two parties is not enough to capture the whole diversity of thinking of Brazilian Representatives, a number of 5-6
parties would be more than enough to capture all ideological/philosophical positions of the whole society, showing that more
than the 30 Brazilian parties are not necessary. (4) The degree of disagreement is stronger in the beginning of a legislature and
evolves to a consensus by the end of the term.
We emphasize the following aspects of our methodology: (1) It is blind to any bias seeing only the revealed final result
of the members behaviour. Any regularity observed can then be further and deeper analysed, to search for explanations for
the findings. (2) It shows connection between the members, regardless of the subject of the bills. Any analyses of the bill
contents would require a step further into the semantics of the bills. (3) All the data was publicly available at the internet, as
required by Brazilian transparency laws. It is clear today that a no questionnaire sociology is possible when people express
themselves freely at the internet. The problems with asking question are, first, the bias always present in the choosing/phrasing
of the questions, and second, people answers to a hypothetical question in a different way they would answer in a real situation.
Decisions in real life require much thinking and conversations with close trusted people. On the other hand, it is hard to make
sure one have a representative random sample from the freely available thoughts at the internet. Other important issue, which
generated a large controversy nowadays, was how to pay the due respect for the privacy of the internet users. We did not had to
face any of these issues. First, the data we used comes from public available records of the votes. Second, these data refers to
Deputy‘s real votes, and not answers to hypothetical questions. The politicians are influenced not only by their own beliefs
and their electorate, but also by their party, fellows, funding groups, Government actions, negotiations among their peers,
and so on. Therefore, our analysis based on the revealed political preferences contains much more information than just the
politician/electorate beliefs and thinking, but also on their response to surrounding interactions.
There are a number of hypotheses to explain the large unnecessary number of parties in Brazil (32). The first is that people
created parties "for rental" to later negotiate with the bigger main parties. The question is, then, how they managed to get
enough votes to exist as a party. Another hypothesis, is that Brazilians tend to vote in the candidates they know well, regardless
their party and or ideology, which facilitates the existence of large number of parties. This seems plausible by the fact that
there are a large number of parties represented in the congress, which means they received enough votes to be elected even
when they did not belong to the 3 or 4 main parties. The polarization of the Representative’s votes in congress observed in this
report, however, shows that they tend to have a firm position, especially in the beginning of the term. That means that there
are some commitment of the population votes with political position, or that, there is a pre-selection of candidates that have
more firm political position. There is also another hypothesis for the large number of Brazilian parties. If there is no internal
democracy inside the parties, and just a small number of leaders decide who will run as candidate or not, then candidates
that see themselves as competitive tend to create another party or join a smaller party. If this is true the number of parties
represented in the congress would be large, which indeed happens.
Observation (4) about the consensus/dissension, also can be explained by different hypothesis. First the Machiavellian
hypothesis that a new government tends to take unpopular measures in the beginning of their mandate and the most popular one
by the end of the term, especially when re-election is allowed. Other hypothesis is that government tend to buy Representative
support with time, bringing most of them to their side. Game theory34, however, shows that consensus builds up in repeated
games, especially when the tit-for-tat strategy is used, without the need to buy support. Government tends to learn what can be
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approved by that group of Deputies, which, on their side, also tend to learn what can be possible with that government and that
House of Representatives. This learning curve will tend to screen the proposed bills to only ones with better chance to approval.
This would mean a large consensual approval of the bills in the last periods of the term. There are, also, bills rephrasing and
reformulation in a brand new bill in order to assure its approval, with the consequent rejection of the original bills. This would
mean not only a consensus for the approval of new bills together with a consensus for the rejection of the original bills. The
question raised by the observation of consensus building during a legislature is if these consensuses happen to better serve the
representative voters or as a betrayal to the voters? Although we did not examine the Representative choice as a function of the
content of the bills proposed, which would have to involve a complex semantic analysis, our methodology can highlight cluster
of Representatives with regularities deserving a deeper understanding.
Our observation also shows that 2015 was a complete atypical year compared to the past first years of a presidential term.
However, 2015 was an atypical year in all aspects. The presidential election was practically a tie and an economic downturn
fueled protests in the whole country. Although, the Rousseff’s impeachment happened only in the middle of 2016, the process
started in 2015 and generated "noise" during the whole year. Car Wash operation which started in 2014 reached the first
politicians in 2015 also generated political unrest in the country. From the MST ordered correlation matrix it seems that a
hard core of presidential supporters became isolated in the congress, with the correspondingly vanishing of the big cluster of
government supporters observed in previous years. It is possible, then, that MST ordered correlation matrix can provide an
indicator of political stability.
In conclusion, our approach, based only on blind observation of the revealed votes in Federal Chamber of Brazil, proved
to be a powerful method to analyze the socio-political behavior of its Representatives. It permitted us to investigate how the
consensus/dissension evolves with time during a legislature term. It also pointed out political instabilities as shown in 2015
data. This analysis opens up a number of questions that could then be studied by a deeper analysis of the bills proposed and the
time evolution of the relationship between Government and Representatives.
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